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Recent  and proposed  legislative  changes encourage  increases  in multioffice banking activ-
ity.  In  this  manuscript,  the  allocation  of  credit  to nonmetropolitan  communities  in  a branch
banking  state  (Arizona)  is  compared  to  that in  a  unit  banking-holding  company  state  (Colo-
rado).  Rapidly  growing  nonmetropolitan  areas  have  experienced  increased  lending  activity
under  statewide  branching  relative  to  unit  banking.  Rural  communities,  which  experienced
slow  or  negative  growth,  had  lower  loan-to-deposit  ratios  under  branch  banking  than  might
have  existed  under  unit  banking.  Therefore,  conversion  to  branch  banking  may  result  in  a
reallocation  of loanable  funds within nonmetropolitan  areas.
The  liberalized  Edge  Act  Corporation
activity  allowed  by  the  International
Banking  Act  of  1978,  the  Garn-St.  Ger-
maine  Act of 1982,  and proposed changes
in the  McFadden  Act  indicate  a willing-
ness on the part of Congress and the Pres-
ident  to  permit  increased  multioffice
banking  activity.  If  additional  deregula-
tion occurs and the geographic restrictions
on bank operations  are relaxed,  the struc-
ture  of  many  nonmetropolitan  banking
markets is likely to change.  This paper in-
vestigates  the  impact  of  increased  mul-
tioffice banking  activity  on the allocation
of credit to rural communities.  Specifical-
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ly,  we address the issue of whether  or not
branch banking results in  a diminution  of
funds  available  to  nonmetropolitan  resi-
dents  and businesses.'
The  relative  ease  of  moving  funds
among  branch  offices  and  the  nonlocal
characteristic  of  bank  ownership  and
management are the principal reasons that
branch banks  may transfer the deposits  of
rural  savers  to urban  loan  markets  more
readily than unit banks. However, the po-
tential  for relatively  low  cost transfers  of
funds does  not  imply  that bank credit  to
nonmetropolitan  areas is reduced under a
statewide branching system, because rural
to urban flows may  coexist with a greater
loan  volume  for  the  local  community.
Nonmetropolitan  unit  banks  are  usually
smaller than branch banks and less able to
reduce  risk  through diversification  and  a
broad deposit  base. Instead, unit banks re-
duce  portfolio  risk through  lessened  loan
activity  (Edwards;  Horvitz  and  Shull;
McCall;  Verbrugge).  Thus, branch offices
'Throughout  this article, metropolitan and urban re-
fer  to  Standard  Metropolitan  Statistical  Areas
(SMSAs).  Alternatively,  rural  and  nonmetropolitan
will  be  used interchangeably  to refer  to  non-Stan-
dard  Metropolitan  Statistical  Areas  (non-SMSAs).
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may allocate  relatively more credit to ru-
ral areas than a single office  bank.
Numerous  studies  have  attempted  to
determine  if  multioffice  banking  organi-
zations transfer  funds from nonmetropol-
itan to metropolitan  branch offices, and if
so, whether these  interbranch  flows result
in  less credit  granted  to rural  areas  than
would  have  been  provided  under  a  unit
banking  system.2 This  research  has dem-
onstrated  that  branch  banking  organiza-
tions  make  proportionately  more  loans
than  unit banks,  and  thus,  the  results  do
not  support  the  contention  that  branch
banks  siphon  funds  from  rural  to urban
markets.  However, two related data prob-
lems  have  limited  the  strength  of  these
earlier studies'  conclusions. First, prior re-
search has  not used branch  office  specific
data.  More  commonly, bank organization
data  were  utilized,  and  this  aggregation
may  be  masking  some  important  alloca-
tional effects. 3 Second, local bank data may
not  represent  local  lending  activity.  For
example,  loan  participation  by  a  bank
could result  in more or less credit extend-
ed  in  a  community  than  is  listed  on  the
books  of the local bank.
In  this paper,  the 1977-80  lending  be-
havior of nonmetropolitan  banks in a pre-
dominantly unit banking state  (Colorado)
and rural branch bank offices in an unlim-
ited  branching  state  (Arizona)  are  com-
pared. 4 Arizona has a highly concentrated,
2 The literature regarding bank structure is extensive
and the relevant  articles are listed  in the reference
section.  An excellent survey article has been written
by McCall.
3 Noteworthy  exceptions to the past research  are two
studies by researchers  at the New  York State Bank-
ing  Department  (Kohn and  Carlo;  Kohn  et al.) in
which  the  loan-to-deposit  ratios  of  New  York's
branch bank  offices and unit banks were compared.
However,  this  intrastate  comparison  may  be  mis-
leading since unit and branch banks may have their
behavior influenced  by the proximity to each other
(see  Horvitz and Shull).
4 Colorado  permits  bank  holding  companies.  How-
ever,  with  the  exception  of  automated  teller  ma-
statewide  branching  system  with only  10
banks (144 bank  offices) serving the state's
rural residents in 1980.  In 1980,  the three
largest banks in Arizona controlled 85 per-
cent of the state's deposits and  120 of the
nonmetropolitan  branch  offices,  making
Arizona the second most concentrated state
banking system  in the nation.  In contrast,
Colorado had 422 unit banks  (151 in non-
metropolitan  counties)  but  only  40  per-
cent of the state's deposits were controlled
by the three largest banks. Although  Col-
orado banking  statutes  permit  multibank
holding companies,  rural bank  participa-
tion  in  these  holding  companies  was  not
widespread.  Only  25  of the  151  nonmet-
ropolitan  banks  were members  of  multi-
bank holding companies  in  1980.5
Loan-to-Deposit  Ratio Analysis
The  Arizona branch banking  data used
in  this analysis are unique.  The data  rep-
resent the 1977 through  1980 year-end to-
tals for demand deposits, time and savings
deposits,  and  outstanding  loans  for  each
branch  office.  The  loan  and  deposit  data
for the individual rural bank offices of Ar-
izona's branch banks were provided by the
home  office  of  each  branch  bank.  All  of
chines and common loan participation  agreements,
funds  are  not  transferable  among  banks  within  a
holding  company.  Moreover,  recent  studies  found
no  significant  difference  between  the overall  loan-
to-deposit ratios of affiliated and independent  banks.
Differential effects  were limited to the composition
of  loan  portfolios  (Graddy  and  Kyle;  Lee  and
Reichert).  Our  analysis  of  the  Colorado  data  con-
firms  this  conclusion.  For  the  time  period  of  this
study,  the  overall  loan-to-deposit  ratios  for  Colo-
rado's affiliated and independent  banks  differed by
no more  than four percentage  points.  These results
allow us to treat  Colorado  as  a unit  banking state.
5 Colorado banking laws do permit each bank to have
one  branch.  However,  according  to  the  Colorado
Division  of  Banking,  this branch  must  be  located
within 3,000 feet  of the home office.  Colorado  also
has industrial banks, financial institutions that func-
tion very much  like  credit unions.  Thus industrial
banks  were not  included in the  Colorado  sample.
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Arizona's  branch  banks  except  the  fifth
largest  provided  data  for  their  nonmet-
ropolitan  branches.  Colorado  unit  bank-
ing data  for  the same  period  were  avail-
able in  Polk World Bank Directories  and
Federal  Reserve  Bank data tapes.
Bank loan-to-deposit  ratio (LDR) is used
as a  proxy for relative  loan activity.  LDR
or loan-to-asset  ratios  have  been  used  by
many  authors  (Edwards;  Eisenbeis;  Hor-
vitz  and Shull;  Kohn  and  Carlo;  Rhoades
and  Savage;  Schweiger  and  McGee;  and
Kohn et al.), thus permitting comparisons
of  our  findings  with  earlier  studies.  One
shortcoming  of LDR as a relative loan ac-
tivity  proxy  is that  bank office  data  may
not accurately  represent  local lending  ac-
tivity.  A  community  may  receive  more
funds than indicated  by local data if non-
local  banks  participate  in  community
loans.  Alternatively,  local  bank data  may
include  loans  that  are  provided  to  resi-
dents  and  businesses  of  other  communi-
ties.  The  Arizona  data  from  individual
branch  offices  is not  subject to  this short-
coming;  branch banks  reported  loans and
deposits  for  the  specific  community  in-
volved  and  cross-office  loan participation
was  represented.  The  local  vs.  nonlocal
problem does  exist for the Colorado data.
However,  a  recent  survey  of  nonmetro-
politan Wisconsin banks (Taff et al.) found
relatively little loan participation activity.
Therefore,  if the portfolio management of
nonmetropolitan  Colorado's  unit banks  is
similar  to that for  rural  Wisconsin's  unit
banks,  the  error  introduced  by  loan par-
ticipation  should be small.
A  comparison  of  the  statewide  LDRs
supports  the hypothesis that large branch
banks are more aggressively managed than
the smaller unit banks  (Table 1).  With the
exception  of  1977,  the banking  system in
Arizona had higher overall loan-to-deposit
ratios than  Colorado.  Moreover,  the  data
of Table  1 suggest that rural-urban  trans-
fers are more substantial  in branch  bank-
ing states.  SMSA  and  non-SMSA  popula-
tion  growth  rates  were  almost  identical
TABLE  1. Aggregate  Loan-to-Deposit  Ratios
by  SMSA  Classification,  Arizona
and  Colorado,  1977-80.a
State-  Non-
State and  Year  wide  SMSAs  SMSAs
1980  Arizonab  .722  .726  .700
Colorado  .654  .647  .673
1979  Arizona  .722  .721  .722
Colorado  .673  .665  .702
1978  Arizona  .718  .726  .672
Colorado  .695  .690  .713
1977  Arizona  .679  .689  .629
Colorado  .680  .679  .685
1977-80  Arizona  .712  .718  .685
Colorado  .674  .669  .693
a  The  Aggregate  LDRs  for  each  classification  were
computed  as  (2  L,)/(Z  D,)  where i represents  individ-
ual banks or branch offices.
bLoan and deposit data for Arizona pertain only to the
three largest banks excluding the  Nogales, Arizona,
branches.
within each state during this period. 6 Yet,
the LDRs  for metropolitan  Arizona  were
higher  than  those  of  non-SMSA  branch
areas  for three  out of the four  years.  The
reverse  was true  in  Colorado.  From  1977
to  1980,  nonmetropolitan  LDRs  in  Colo-
rado  were  never  less  than  the  LDRs  for
the metropolitan  counties.
Despite the apparent rural-urban  trans-
fer of loanable funds in Arizona, the state's
nonmetropolitan  communities did not ex-
perience  a consistent  decrease  in lending
activity.  Arizona's nonmetropolitan  LDRs
exceeded  those  of nonmetropolitan  Colo-
rado for 1979 (.722 to .702) and 1980 (.700
to .673). However, in 1977 and  1978, rural
Arizona's  LDRs  were  smaller  than  those
of nonmetropolitan  Colorado (.629  vs. .685
and  .672  vs.  .713  respectively).  Over  the
period  1977-80,  the  average  LDRs  for
nonmetropolitan  Colorado  (.693)  and
6 The  1970 to 1980  population growth  rates for  met-
ropolitan  and  nonmetropolitan  Arizona  were  54.2
percent and 49.7 percent,  respectively.  The 1970  to
1980  Colorado  SMSA  and  non-SMSA  population
growth  rates  were  30.0  percent  and  32.9  percent,
respectively.
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nonmetropolitan  Arizona  (.685)  were not
significantly  different.7
A  disaggregation  of  the  data  by  com-
munity  growth  rate  categories  (Table  2)
indicates two important differences  in the
relative  lending  activity  of branch  offices
and unit  banks.  First,  the  average  LDRs
of both  Arizona's  branch offices  and  Col-
orado's  unit banks  were  positively  corre-
lated with  local  population  growth rates.
The  positive  relationship  between  LDRs
and  growth  rates  suggests  that  banks
increased  their  lending  in  response  to
greater  local  investment  opportunities.
However,  on  the average,  Arizona's  non-
metropolitan  branch offices were more re-
sponsive  to changes  in  loan demand  than
were  Colorado's  unit banks.  For example,
in  1979,  the  mean  Arizona  LDRs  were
.518,  .692,  .708,  and  .823  for  the  four
community growth rate classifications  (<0,
0-24.9%,  25-49.9%,  and  50%+).  The  av-
erage  1979  Colorado LDRs for the above
growth  rate  categories  were  .686,  .692,
.694,  and  .660, respectively. 8 The  second
obvious difference in unit and branch bank
lending  activity  is  the greater  variability
of LDR values among Arizona branch  of-
fices relative to Colorado's unit banks. Re-
gardless  of  year  or  community  growth
category,  the  range  and variance  of  Ari-
zona's  LDRs  always  exceeded  those  re-
ported  for  Colorado  banks.  Apparently,
factors  besides  community  growth  rates
are important in explaining  bank LDRs.
7 The Nogales,  Arizona,  branch  offices  were  not  in-
cluded in  the  sample because  these  facilities  were
very  popular  depositories  for  Mexican  nationals
during periods of peso devaluation.  Loan-to-deposit
ratios  of  these branches  did  not  accurately  reflect
the  availability  of local  credit.
8 The decline in LDRs for the 50 percent and greater
growth  rate  category  may  reflect  a  lag  between
community  growth  and  bank  lending.  That  is,  for
the very rapidly  growing communities,  deposits are
increasing more  rapidly than outstanding  loans.  Al-
ternatively,  the  decline  in LDRs may  reflect  a dis-
proportionate  representation  of communities  which
attract retirees.
The  increased  flow  of  funds  between
branch bank offices  relative  to unit banks
is consistent with banking theory and ear-
lier empirical studies.  First, lending activ-
ity  of small  unit  banks  is  constrained  by
their  relatively  low  legal  lending  limits
(typically  10  percent  of capital  and sur-
plus)  and their  need  to  maintain  a share
of their assets in a highly liquid form, such
as  in  U.S.  Government  Securities  (Ver-
brugge).  Branch banking organizations are
also  faced  with  legal  lending  limits  and
liquidity requirements.  However, because
branch  banks  are  generally  larger  and
more  diversified,  lending  limits  and  li-
quidity  needs  are  less  restrictive  for  the
branch  banking  organization  as  a whole,
and  of  little  consequence  for  individual
branch bank offices. Second, branch bank-
ing systems can transfer excess funds from
one  local area to another more easily and
economically  than can  a single  office  sys-
tem  (Blackwell).  Finally,  during  tight
money  periods,  a  unit  bank  may  experi-
ence  more difficulty  in acquiring and  re-
taining  funds  from  other  banks  than  a
branch  office  would  experience  in utiliz-
ing excess  funds from other  branches.
Specification  of Regression  Model
The  differences  in  Arizona  and  Colo-
rado LDRs may  be attributable  to factors
other  than  branch  banks'  propensity  to
reallocate  loanable funds. Multiple regres-
sion  analysis  is  needed  to correct  for  dif-
ferences  in local market  conditions,  bank
specific  management  behavior,  and  com-
munity  demographic  and  employment
characteristics.  The variables and their ex-
pected relationship to bank LDRs are pre-
sented below.
Local Market Conditions. Any number
of local economic  variables may influence
a bank's  lending  behavior.  The  selection
of two states with similar  economies  con-
trols  for  some  of  these  effects,  but  it  is
necessary to account for a few obvious dif-
ferences  among  the  states'  nonmetropoli-
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tan  banking  markets.  First,  rural  bank
LDRs should  be  positively  related  to the
local  market  demand  for loanable  funds.
The  1980  to  1970  population  ratio  (PR)
for the local community is used as a proxy
for loan demand.  In addition,  a quadratic
term  for  population  growth  (PR2)  is  in-
cluded  to  account  for  a  possible  "dimin-
ishing  return"  effect.  The  coefficient  on
this  variable  is  expected  to  be  negative.
Second, the  economic  vitality  of the var-
ious communities  is measured  by  growth
of communities'  per capita income  (PCY)
and  the  counties'  unemployment  rates
(UN).  Growth  of  community  per  capita
income is hypothesized  to be positively re-
lated  to bank  LDRs, while  UN  and  LDR
should  be negatively  related.  Finally,  the
availability  of  alternative  credit  sources
(other  banks,  savings  and  loan  associa-
tions,  industrial  banks, and credit unions)
may  force  banks  to  deviate  from  their
preferred  loan  portfolios.  The degree  of
competition  is  measured  by  the  number
of alternative  credit  sources  in the  com-
munity  (CS).  Other  financial  institutions
will increase  bank  LDRs  if  these  institu-
tions serve  as  substitute  depositories  to  a
greater  extent  than  they  serve  as  substi-
tute creditors. But if the reverse is the case,
the existence  of other  credit  courses  will
decrease  bank  LDRs.  Thus,  the  relation-
ship between  CS  and  LDR  is  indetermi-
nate a priori.
Management Behavior. The  structure
of a  bank's liabilities  is likely to influence
the bank's willingness to acquire relatively
illiquid  assets  (loans).  Since  time  deposits
generally  pose less  of  a liquidity  problem
for  banks  than  demand  deposits,  banks
with  relatively  high  time  deposits-total
deposits ratios (TDR) are expected to have
relatively  high  LDRs.  For  Arizona's
branch  offices,  TDR  is  the  time  deposit-
total deposit ratio of the statewide branch
banking  organization.  Membership  in  a
multibank holding company (MBHC) may
also  influence  the  management  behavior
of Colorado unit banks.  However,  as not-
ed earlier,  few nonmetropolitan Colorado
banks  were  affiliates  of  MBHC,  and  the
LDRs  of  affiliated  and independent  non-
metropolitan  banks  did not  differ signifi-
cantly.  Therefore,  a  variable  indicating
membership  in  an  MBHC  is  not  includ-
ed.9
Demographic and Employment  Char-
acteristics. The age distribution  of a com-
munity's residents is likely to influence lo-
cal  banks'  LDRs,  since  the  demand  for
loanable funds by the elderly  is relatively
low.  The  percent  of the community  pop-
ulation  over  age  65  (EP)  is  included  to
account  for  the  impact  of  elderly  popu-
lation.  Both  Arizona  and  Colorado  have
nonmetropolitan  communities  with  spe-
cilaized  employment  bases.  If  a commu-
nity  has  a  concentrated  employment
structure,  credit  needs  may  be quite dif-
ferent  from  areas  with  diversified  eco-
nomic  bases.  For  example,  mining  and
manufacturing  concerns  are  less  likely  to
be locally owned than businesses  engaged
in  agriculture,  service,  and  trade.  Vari-
ables representing  the proportion  of  local
employment  in mining  (MN)  and  manu-
facturing  (MFG) are  included to account
for the possibility that the credit needs of
these  firms  are  provided  through  non-
local  credit sources.  The proportion  of lo-
cal employment in agriculture  (AG) is also
included  in  the  estimation  since  credit
needs  of  farmers  and  ranchers  have  in-
creased  greatly  over  the  period  of  this
study.  This variable  is hypothesized  to be
positively  related  to bank LDRs.
Bank Structure. The influence  of bank
structure on the relative  flow of funds be-
tween  slowly  and  rapidly  growing  com-
munities is represented by three variables
(BS,  BS(PR),  and  BS(PR 2)).  BS  is a binary
variable that  takes  on  a  value of  one  for
Arizona  banks  and  zero  for  Colorado
9 The size  of a bank may  also be an  important  influ-
ence  on  management  behavior.  This  variable  was
omitted from the analysis because  it was highly cor-
related with bank structure.
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banks.  BS(PR)  and  BS(PR2)  indicate  the
interaction  between  bank  structure-pop-
ulation growth  rates.  If branch banks  (Ar-
izona)  were  more  responsive  than  unit
banks  (Colorado)  to  regional  differences
in  loan  demand,  the  coefficient  of  the
BS(PR)  variable  will be  positive.
Equation  (1)  represents  the  regression
model  used  in the analysis:
ALDR  = ao  + aCS + a 2TDR  + a3PR
(?)  (+)  (+)
+ a 4PR
2 + a5EP + a 6MN  + a 7MFG
(-)  (-)  (-)  (-)
+ a8AG + a9PCY  + aOUN  + a,,BS
(+)  (+)  (-)  (?)
+ a,2BS(PR)  + a13BS(PR
2) + e  (1)
(?)  (?)
where  ALDR  = average  bank loan-to-de-
posit  ratios  for  Arizona  and  Colorado
banks,  1977-80.  The  hypothesized  signs
for each coefficient  are provided below the
variable  names.
Empirical Results
The results of our regression analysis are
presented  in  Table  3.10  All of the  statisti-
cally  significant  variables  had the  antici-
pated  signs.  The  number  of  alternative
credit  sources  and  growth  in  per  capita
income  were  directly  related  to  bank
lending  activity-the  greater  the  local
market competition  and the healthier  the
local economy, the higher the bank LDR.
The time deposit ratio  was also  positively
related  to  LDR  and  highly  significant,
conforming to the expectation that a long-
er  term  structure  of  liabilities  permits  a
bank to decrease the liquidity of  its assets.
Banks  or  branch  offices,  located  in  com-
10 The  R
2 of the regression  equation  (.153)  is low,  as
is  generally  the  case  for  cross-sectional  banking
studies.  However,  unless  the  low  R
2 results  from
omitted  variables  that  are  highly  correlated  with
the included independent  variables,  the results  are
unbiased.
munities  which  attract  retirees,  experi-
enced relatively  low demand  for loanable
funds.  Most of the variables  depicting the
employment  characteristics  of  the  com-
munities  (MN,  MFG,  AG)  had  the antic-
ipated  signs,  but  none  of  the  coefficients
were  significant  at  the  10  percent  level.
The  failure  to find  a  significant  relation-
ship  between  employment  structure  and
bank LDRs may be attributable to the use
of county employment  statistics instead of
community employment  data.  Unexpect-
edly,  UN  was  positively  related  to  bank
LDR, although the coefficient was not sig-
nificant at the  10 percent  level."
The  impact  of  bank  structure  on  the
allocation  of  credit  to  nonmetropolitan
communities  is  indicated  by  the  five
growth rate  and bank structure  variables
(PR, PR 2, BS, BS(PR), BS(PR 2)). The insig-
nificant coefficients on PR and PR2 in con-
junction  with  significant  coefficients  for
BS(PR) and  BS(PR 2) imply that the LDRs
of Colorado's unit banks were not affected
by local  population growth rates.  This re-
lationship  is  illustrated  in  Figure  1 by  a
linear function  with  a  slope  of  zero and
intercept  C (the mean  Colorado LDR).  In
contrast, the significant  coefficients  on the
BS,  BS(PR),  and  BS(PR 2)  variables  imply
that  the  LDR  of Arizona's  branch  banks
was a function of community growth rates.
The  coefficient  of  the  BS  variable  repre-
sents the difference between  the intercept
values of the Colorado and Arizona LDRs.
Thus,  the LDR  of  Arizona's  rural branch
banks  will  be  .403  less  than  Colorado's
mean  LDR  when  PR  equals  zero  (a  pos-
sibility  only for  ghost  towns).  The  coeffi-
cients  on  the  BS(PR)  and  BS(PR 2)  vari-
ables  indicate  that  Arizona  LDRs  were
responsive  to  changes  in  community
growth  rates.  Arizona  bank  LDRs  in-
"Bank  structure  was correlated  with the  county un-
employment  rate;  however,  the  removal  of  this
variable from the regression equation had no effect
on the coefficients  or t-values  of the bank structure
variables.
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TABLE 3. Effect of Bank  Structure on  Nonmetropolitan  Bank  Loan-To-Deposit  Ratios,  1977-
80.
Mean Values
Independent Variables  of Variables  Coefficients  "t"  Values
BS:  =  1 for unlimited branching, Arizona  .366  -. 403  3.48***
0 for unit banking,  Colorado
CS:  number of alternative credit sources in the commu-  3.126  .010  2.85***
nity (other banks, savings and loan  associations, in-
dustrial  banks, credit unions)
TDR:  average time to total  deposit ratio 1977-80  .631  .556  3.35***
PR:  1980 population/1970  population,  community  1.563  -. 118  1.15
PR 2 3.312  .018  .83
BS(PR)  .662a  .275  2.46***
BS(PR 2)  1.763  -. 033  1.55*
PCY:  percent change in  community  per capita  income,  93.960  .002  1.84**
1969-77
EP:  percent of community  population over 65 years old,  13.125  -. 009  4.30***
1980
MFG:  percent of county labor force in  manufacturing,  9.661  -. 001  .57
1980
MN:  percent of county labor force in  mining,  1980  7.598  -. 001  1.08
AG:  percent of county labor force in agriculture, 1978  3.202  .003  .89
UN:  county unemployment  rate,  1980  5.596  .008  1.13
Constant  .353  2.21**
N = 238  R
2 = .153  F = 4.292***
*,  **,  ***  Indicate one-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%,  1%  levels respectively.
a  Mean  values of PR and PR 2 for Arizona are  1.855 and  5.117, respectively.
ARI
(LDR=C  -.403 +.
/C-.403
1.94
I ,  I1
u  1.0  2.0
1980  to 1970  Populati(
Figure  1.  Estimated  Bank I
nity Population  (
tionships,  Colora(
creased at a decreasing rate as community
population  growth  rates  increased.  The
ZONA  Arizona  LDR-PR  relationship  is  repre-
275PR  -.033PR2)  sented graphically  in Figure 1 by the qua-
dratic  function  LDR = C  - .403 +  .275
(PR)  -. 033 (PR2).
The  two  functions  intersect  when  the
1980-1970 population ratio equals 1.94 (an
COLORADO  annual population growth rate of 6.9 per-
(LDR-C)  cent).  Banks  in  nonmetropolitan  Arizona
communities  with  an  annual  population
growth  rate  of less  than  6.9  percent  had
LDRs less than similar Colorado commu-
nities.  Arizona  communities  with growth
rates above 6.9 percent experienced LDRs
jI  __  PR  greater  than  the  Colorado  average.  The
3.0  4.0  mean  value  of  the  Arizona  population
on  Ratio  variable  was  1.86  (an annual  rate  of  6.4
LDR  and Commu-  percent).  Thus,  the  results  indicate  that
growth  Rate Rela-  Arizona  branch  offices  located  in  above-





December 1984Bank Structure and Rural Credit
greater than those of Colorado  banks.  Ar-
izona  banks  located  in  slowly  growing
communities had LDRs less than those re-
ported  by  Colorado's  unit  banks.  The
above findings  are consistent  with the hy-
pothesis that branch banks reallocate funds
from capital surplus to capital shortage re-
gions.l2
Conclusions  and Implications
Comparisons  of  Arizona  and  Colorado
LDRs provide evidence  of three principal
differences  in  branch  and  unit  banking
lending  behavior.  As  anticipated,  Arizo-
na's  branch  banks  made  proportionately
more  loans  than  Colorado's  unit  banks.
Branch banks  can take more risks in lend-
ing because of broader deposit bases, more
diversified  loan  portfolios,  and  easier  ac-
cess  to  national  money  markets.  Second,
higher LDRs in metropolitan  vs. nonmet-
ropolitan  Arizona  indicate  that  branch
banks  may  have  transferred  funds  from
rural to metropolitan  branches.  However,
the LDRs of nonmetropolitan  Arizona and
Colorado were similar, indicating that the
relationship between metro and nonmetro
branches  cannot  be  classified  as  "para-
sitic."  Third,  Arizona's  branch  banking
system  appeared  more  responsive  to  re-
gional differences  in the demand for loan-
able  funds  than  Colorado's  unit  banks.
Faster growing areas received  more credit
in  a multioffice  system.
The  current  trend  toward  increased
multioffice  banking  will  affect  the  avail-
ability  of credit in nonmetropolitan  com-
munities.  However,  the  net  effect  of
branch  banking  on  the  reallocation  of
loanable funds appears to be primarily in-
12 Further  evidence  of  the  responsiveness  of  branch
banks  to  regional  differences  in  loan  demand  is
provided  by  running  separate  regressions  for  the
Arizona  and  Colorado  data.  For  Arizona,  LDR =
.170  PR - .017  PR
2. Both coefficients  were signif-
icant at the .01 level and the R
2 =  .384. Neither PR
nor PR
2 was significant at the .10 level for the Col-
orado regression,  and the  R
2 was only  .046.
trarural  and  not  rural-to-urban.  There-
fore,  rural  communities  as  a  whole  will
not "gain"  or "lose"  if branch banking ac-
tivity  is  expanded.  Rapidly growing  non-
metropolitan  areas  are  likely  to  experi-
ence an increase  in lending activity, while
loan-to-deposit  ratios  in  slower  growing
cities  will be lower. This difference  in the
allocation  of  funds is  consistent  with im-
proved economic efficiency.  To the extent
that population growth rate differences  are
a good proxy for loan demand differences,
a  branch  banking  system  appears  more
able to adjust to changes in loan demand.
However,  these  funds'  flows  may  be
viewed by some as an additional retardant
to the growth and development  of  slower
growing  regions.  Thus,  despite  the  fact
that  economic  evidence  favors  more  ex-
tensive branching, the potentially  adverse
social consequences  guarantee the contin-
uation of this debate.
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